INTRODUCTION
Pakistan is a constituent of four federating units-Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Paktunkhwa and Balochistan. There is a huge difference in the extent and quality of public services provision among these provinces. The variation in public service provision, that was mainly the result of intergovernmental fiscal transfers has created vertical and horizontal imbalances among the provinces, which were further translated into the districts of each province.
In Pakistan, like other developing countries, well defined and constitutionally protected intergovernmental fiscal transfer systems are operational. The National Finance Commission is a prime arrangement for the distribution of funds among the federal and provincial governments. Whereas the Provincial Finance Commission is responsible for the distribution of funds among the provincial, districts and sub-district governments. In Pakistan the prime responsibility of tax collection lies with the federal government, whereas, the responsibilities of the provision of social, economic and community services lies with the provincial and districts government. The purpose of the transfers in Pakistan from higher to lower level governments is to bridge the gap between the revenue and expenditures and to promote the equitable growth. This will also help reducing poverty among the districts.
The new system of devolution implemented in 2001 has brought several changes in the intergovernmental fiscal relationship among the provinces and districts. After devolution 2001 the provision of social services and few economic services were transferred to the district governments. This entails and envisages a new and comprehensive fiscal relationship between the Province and the Districts. The Provincial Finance Commission (PFC), a special feature of the 2001 devolution, announces a three year horizon and formula for the distribution of resources which predicts the flow of funds to the districts from the province.
The intergovernmental transfer systems have various objectives. However, the fiscal equalisation and redistribution of funds among the different tiers of government are the prime objectives of the fiscal transfer. The PFC gives a formula based allocation of funds among the districts to minimise the deprivation among the districts. The PFC deals with both vertical inequity-the inequity between the provincial government and districts governments-and horizontal inequity-inequities among the districts.
Since 2001 in each province the two PFC awards have been announced so far, first in 2001 and second in 2007. Similarly, attempts were also made to construct district wise deprivation index in each province like Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC) in 1998 and in 2005. The Deprivation Index indicates in each district of each province the number of people who do not access to basic needs of education, health, clean water and housing. Haroon (2007) constructed deprivation index for each district in Pakistan. The selection of indicators is based on the theory and district-wise data availability. These include literacy rate and out of School children, housing quality and congestion, residential housing services and employment status. The gender disparity is incorporated taking these measures separately for male and female population.
The purpose of this paper is to see whether any link can be ascertained between the PFC transfer and the deprivation index. The link between the funds transfer and deprivation index will indicate whether the funds transfer is pro-poor districts and fiscal equaliser or not.
The paper is organised as follow. Section 2 reviews the literature on the theatrical and applied issues of fiscal equalisation. Section 3 gives data collection, methodology and results and Section 4 gives the conclusion and policy implication.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
There is a rich literature on fiscal federalism both on theoretical and applied aspects. Bhal, Boex and Vazquez (2002) discuss the issues of designing of intergovernmental fiscal transfer. This study mentions the generally accepted reasons for intergovernmental fiscal transfer are-improving vertical fiscal imbalances, improving the horizontal fiscal balances, compensating for externalities and funding for merits goods. Boex (2002) develop allocation formula for Decentralised Financing and Development Programme in Nepal. Boex (2002) included relative weight of rural population, relative weight of fiscal need and relative weight of development in the distributional formula. The paper highlight when there is suspect of measurement errors the Human Development Index should not be used as it will not be fiscal equaliser. Qiao, et al. (2002 Qiao, et al. ( ) using panel data between 1985 Qiao, et al. ( and 1998 in China find that there is positive relationship exists between the growth and inequality, which implies higher growth will lead more inequality. Hofman and Guerra (2002) explain causes and consequences of fiscal inequities among sub-national government in East Asia. This study using the data of five countries China, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam reveals that endowment and fiscal capacities among sub-national entities are large and reason for larger inequities before equalisation efforts. The study concludes that current system of equalisation in East Asia is mildly equaliser and even after such efforts the disparity is still large. Yan (2003) concludes that fiscal reforms of 1985 and 1994 failed to bring any fiscal equalisation. Ahmad and other (2000) conclude that the fiscal reforms have increased income distribution.
DATA, METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
In this section we will discuss the results which will show whether the transfers are reducing poverty and deprivation at districts level or not? The results also touched upon the fiscal equalisation or income inequality among the districts. The "equalisation" or "fiscal equalisation" means "the capability of sub-national government to deliver similar level of services at similar levels of taxes," [Searle (2002) and Hofman and Guerra (2002) ].
The data for the study is collected from different sources of Provincial and local budget documents. The Provincial development Statistics are used for the data on transfers, population and other provincial and districts variables. The government of Pakistan website www.gov.pk is also used. The purpose of the paper is seeing whether the transfer from the provincial government to the districts government is fiscal equalisers or not. To answer this question this paper uses different statistical results, which we discuss one by one. The Table 1 (detailed relevant tables are given in the Appendix) gives the Rank Correlation between the first ranking on the basis of district deprivation index and the second ranking on the basis of per capita transfers to the districts. Table 1 In the deprivation index the most deprived district get rank 1 and least deprived district (most developed) gets last rank, where as the per capita transfer ranking is arranged on ascending order i.e. the district get maximum per capita transfer gets rank 1 and the district which get minimum per capita transfer gets last rank. The value of rank correlation indicates to what extent the per capita transfers from provincial government to districts government are based on the district deprivation index. If the rank correlation is one it means the transfers are completely based on deprivation index and it is most desirable distribution system and minus one means most undesirable distribution system. (Table 1) (Table 2) . These results show the coefficients between new and old deprivation indices are 0.905, 0.790 and 0.864 for Pakistan, Punjab and Sindh respectively, whereas 0.779 and 0.856 for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan respectively. The variables in all these equations are significant at 95 percent level and shows at-least little changes are observed between two indices which imply that fiscal transfers have made little effects on deprivation rankings. Table gives value of maximum, minimum and average deprived level of districts, the ratio of maximum to minimum deprivation and its coefficient of variation. This Table also gives value of maximum, minimum and average per capita transfers to each district, the ratio of maximum to minimum per capita transfer and its coefficient of variation. Table 3 indicate inter provincial and intra provincial (inter district) deprivation and disparity profile and per capita transfers and help us to evaluate whether the fiscal transfer in last few years have reduced deprivation and disparity both at inter provincial and intra provincial level. Table 3 shows at overall Pakistan level for 2003 the average per capita transfer level among district was 855.9 and increased to 1349.4 in 2007 which implies the per capita transfer, on average, have increased in the districts. The level of maximum value of transfer was 4476.36 increased to 5694.92 whereas the minimum value of transfer decreased from 425.3 to 389.4. The ratio of maximum to minimum transfer has increased from 10.51 to 14.62 and coefficient of variation of transfer increased from 0.2989 to 0.3277.
This Table 3 Table further shows the level of maximum deprived district which had value of 89.06 reduced to 82.76 whereas the minimum value of deprivation reduced from 24.59 to 20.59. However, the Table 3 shows that these fiscal transfers fail to reduce deprivation disparity, in fact, it has worsened it. The ratio of maximum to minimum deprivation has increased from 3.62 to 3.95 and coefficient of variation of deprivation increased from 0.123 to 0.131.
The analysis of per capita transfers and deprivation index for overall Pakistan show very clear trends. The per capita transfer has increased and average deprivation has decreased. The figures also show the ratio of maximum to minimum transfer increased and consequently the ratio of maximum to minimum deprivation has also increased. The figures also indicate the movement in the coefficient of variations in the transfers and the deprivation indices are in the same direction and increasing.
As for as the province wise changes in the per capita transfer and the deprivation levels are concerned, all four provinces also gives similar trends. In Punjab which is the largest populated province, the average deprivation level declined from 58.41 to 52.53 as a result of increase in average per capita transfer from 635.65 to 1098.92. The Punjab results show the extreme inequality in deprivation increases as indicated by the increase in the ratio of maximum to minimum transfer and maximum to minimum deprivation. However, the coefficient of variation of both per capita transfer and deprivation has decreased over time. This explains the inequality at average level has decreased over time.
The least populated but area wise largest province, Balochistan, show the average level deprivation has decreased from 73.16 to 69.20 as a result of average increase in per capita transfer from 1275.21 to 1532.92. The results also show the reduction in deprivation inequality but this can partially be explained by the ratio of maximum to minimum transfers.
The average decline in deprivation in other two provinces Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa from 62.03 to 54.95 and 66.17 to 58.43 respectively can be explained by the average increase in transfers both in Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The extreme deprivation inequality in Sindh has increased overtime and can be explained both by the increasing ratio of maximum to minimum transfer. However, the inequality in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa did not change despite a very high increase in the ratio of maximum to minimum transfer and coefficient of variation in the transfers.
CONCLUSIONS
There are several results of the study based on several statistical analyses. First, the analysis based on rank correlation shows in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa over time the fiscal transfers are pro poor districts, whereas in Balochistan the transfers over time become less pro-poor districts and in Sindh it remained neutral. Second, there is significant increase in per capita transfers in all districts of Pakistan. These increases are due to increase in economic growth more than 6 per cent GDP growth for the last few years and special recognition of the devolution phenomenon in last several years. Third, deprivation has decreased almost in all districts in last few years because of significant increase in per capita transfers.
Fourth, the results of the study shows the deprivation inequalities have not reduced as a result of increase in fiscal transfers. In fact, in most of the cases, the deprivation inequalities have been increased. One, because the per capita increase to the least deprived districts equivalently the developed districts are much more than the per capita increase to more deprived districts. Two, per unit cost of service delivery is much higher in those districts which are very large in area and in those districts where infrastructure is weak and perhaps these aspects are ignored in the designing of transfers. Three, the own revenues as percentage of transfers are much less in most deprived districts compare to least deprived districts and the capability of using available funds is also more in least deprived districts. Four, the least deprived districts which are rich districts are also politically very strong districts. They can also in position to attract parallel funding from the higher level government and borrowing from the foreign donors. Fifth, reason that can be given why the deprivation has decreased but disparity did not, is the deliberate effort and perception of the government to take steps to improve deprivation situation first and then income distribution aspect will be taken into consideration. Table A2 
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